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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Affordable Care Act’s contraception mandate (“the Mandate”) 
requires employers to provide insurance coverage of contraceptive methods 
to employees at no cost.
1
  The Act demonstrates Congress’ growing 
recognition of the correlation between a woman’s reproductive anatomy 
and her equal participation in both society and the economy.
2
  Although 
publicized as a “comprehensive” plan, the Mandate fails to provide 
contraception coverage to all women.
3
  The Mandate’s failure to eliminate 
the burdens and barriers to contraception access is attributed to several 
factors, such as exemptions in the Act’s language and non-compliance on 
the part of insurance companies.
4
  The Mandate contains several 
exemptions that create intentional, albeit necessary, barriers to 
contraception access; however,
5
 these barriers have been permitted on 
constitutional grounds.
6
  Along with intentional barriers, the Mandate has 
created unintentional barriers that make it ineffective at providing coverage 
and equality for women.
7
 
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court established the right to privacy is 
                                                          
 1.  The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) 
(2012). 
 2.  See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
846 (1992) (upholding a woman’s right to receive an abortion).  
 3.  See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1143 (10th Cir. 
2013) (stating the Mandate does not provide coverage for private employers with 
grandfathered plans, for employers with fewer than fifty employees, and for religious 
employers). 
 4.  See id. (detailing the exemptions contained in the Mandate that excuse certain 
employers from complying with the provision). 
 5.  See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4)(4) (2016); The Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1(a) (West 1997) (protecting the free exercise 
of religion, which provided the basis for the religious exemption in the Mandate). 
 6.  See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014) 
(discussing the religious exemption for for-profit corporations). 
 7.  See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1124 (stating that over 100 million people 
remain uncovered by the Mandate); see also Committee Opinion No. 615: Access to 
Contraception, AM. COLL. OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS (Jan. 2015), 
https://www.acog.org/-/media/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Health-Care-for-
Underserved-Women/co615.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20160722T1016341074 [hereinafter 
Access to Contraception] (describing the importance and difficulties of access to 
contraception).  
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fundamental; therefore, the right cannot be infringed upon unless the 
government can show the intrusion served a narrowly tailored and 
compelling state interest.
8
  The Court also found that the right to privacy 
encompassed the right to marital privacy, including the constitutional right 
to decide whether or not to have children.
9
  Therefore, as contraception 
affects the right to make this decision, the Court found contraception to be 
a constitutional right.
10
  Although the Mandate has succeeded in lowering 
the nationwide cost of contraception, barriers to contraceptive access still 
exist.
11
  These barriers have placed huge burdens on women in the United 
States, violating their constitutional right to privacy.
12
 
This Comment argues that the Mandate violates the constitutional right 
to privacy, and therefore a stronger contraception mandate is necessary.  In 
addition, this Comment asserts that states must enact more comprehensive 
contraceptive plans, using Maryland’s Contraceptive Equity Act of 2016 as 
the best example of such a plan.
13
  Part II of this Comment provides a 
history of the constitutional right to privacy and the legislation surrounding 
an individual’s right to contraceptive accessibility.
14
  Part III argues that the 
Mandate contains unlawful barriers to contraception access and is 
unconstitutional under the right to privacy.
15
  Additionally, Part III 
contends that the Maryland Contraceptive Equity Act provides the most 
comprehensive contraception coverage and is a constitutional alternative to 
the Mandate.
16
  Part IV concludes that because the Maryland Contraceptive 
Equity Act fills the gaps left by the Mandate it should be a model for other 
                                                          
 8.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973) (concluding fundamental rights 
must be free from government intrusion). 
 9.  See id. at 153.  
 10.  See id. at 154. 
 11.  See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1124 (stating that at least 50 million people do 
not have coverage due to exempt health plans). 
 12.  See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
872 (1992) (clarifying that health regulations that have the purpose or effect of a 
substantial obstacle to a woman’s reproductive life impose undue burdens on that right 
and are unconstitutional). 
 13.  See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148 (2016); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 
15-826.1 (2016). 
 14.  See infra Part II (describing the history and enactment of Maryland’s 
Contraceptive Equity Act of 2016 to illustrate its potential success). 
 15.  See infra Part III (explaining that barriers from the Mandate create substantial 
burdens on women’s access to birth control). 
 16.  See infra Part III (arguing that the Maryland Contraceptive Equity Act provide 
coverage which eliminates the barriers the Act’s religious exemption will survive 
judicial scrutiny). 
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states to create similar contraceptive coverage.
17
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A. The Constitutional Right to Privacy 
The Constitution does not provide an explicit right to privacy; however, 
the Supreme Court has ruled that the Bill of Rights contains penumbras that 
establish such a right.
18
  Existing within the peripheral of the First, Third, 
Fourth and Ninth Amendments, the right to privacy protects each 
individual’s authority to make decisions regarding her body and private life 
absent government intrusion.
19
  Since Justice Brandeis described this right 
as the “right to be let alone,” it has been interpreted by the Courts and has 
taken many forms, such as the right to protections against wire-tapping, the 
right to view pornography in one’s home, and the right to contraception.
20
  
Although comprehensive in scope, the right to privacy has been narrowly 




1. Right to Privacy as a Fundamental Right 
The controversial case Roe v. Wade cemented the constitutionality of the 
right to privacy.
22
  Although the Court acknowledged that some intrusive 
government regulations are necessary and appropriate under certain 
                                                          
 17.  See infra Part IV (concluding that the Affordable Care Act’s contraception 
mandate fails to protect a women’s right to privacy and states need to enact more 
comprehensive contraception coverage mandates). 
 18.  See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965) (finding a right to 
privacy within the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments of the U.S. 
Constitution).  
 19.  See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (upholding an individual’s 
freedom to associate and privacy in one’s association under the First Amendment’s 
right of assembly); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (describing the 
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure as a “protection(s) 
against all governmental invasions of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of 
life”). 
 20.  See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (finding the right to privacy 
includes intellectual and emotional needs, including an individual’s decision to watch 
pornography); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (concluding wiretapping is an invasion of the right to privacy). 
 21.  See e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972) (motherhood); 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (marriage); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 
U.S. 158, 170-71 (1944) (family); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) 
(procreation); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (child-rearing).  
 22.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973) (protecting the right to privacy 
from government intrusion through strict judicial scrutiny). 
4
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circumstances, the Court found that the right to privacy was fundamental.
23
 
The Court recognized that the right to privacy was not absolute and must 
be weighed against important state interests.
24
  Any regulation that may 
impede on the right to privacy must be narrowly tailored to express only 
the legitimate state interest involved.
25
  For example, the Court in Roe v. 
Wade concluded that a Texas statute criminalizing abortions failed to 
demonstrate a compelling state interest to justify infringement upon an 
individual’s right to privacy.
26
  In this case, the Court established a 
temporarily expansive constitutional right to abortion.
27
 
2. The Right to Marital Privacy and Contraception 
A significant extension of the right to privacy is the right to 
contraception, established by the Supreme Court in Griswold v. 
Connecticut.
28
  In Griswold, the Court upheld the right to marital privacy 
when it struck down a statute criminalizing the use, distribution, and 
recommendation of the use of contraceptives.
29
  Justice Douglas reasoned 
that it would be “repulsive” to permit police officers to enter the private 
bedrooms of couples to look for evidence of contraceptive use.
30
  The 
Court effectively established a constitutional right for married couples to 
                                                          
 23.  See id. at 154 (holding that government interference may be justified when a 
“state’s interests as to protection of health, medical standards and prenatal life, become 
dominant”). 
 24.  See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); cf. Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (holding any classification penalizing the 
exercise of right of interstate travel is unconstitutional unless justified by a compelling 
government interest). 
 25.  See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); see also Baird, 405 
U.S. at 463-64 (White, J., concurring) (finding a regulation requiring a prescription to 
obtain dangerous contraceptive material was not unnecessarily broad, and therefore 
constitutional under a strict scrutiny analysis). 
 26.  See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164 (holding that the state’s interest in in protecting 
health and potential life did not justify broad limitations on a woman’s ability to 
receive an abortion in the early stages of pregnancy).  
 27.  But see Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 873-74 (1992) (weakening the constitutional right to choose abortion by replacing 
strict scrutiny test with an undue burden test, which invalidates a statute if it is too 
burdensome on a fundamental right). 
 28.  See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86 (finding a law that forbids contraceptives an 
unconstitutional intrusion on martial privacy).  
 29.  See id. (concluding that a law criminalizing contraceptive use instead of 
regulating manufacture or sale, achieves goals by “having a maximum destructive 
impact upon that relationship”). 
 30.  See id. at 486 (ruling that a law regulating contraception is not only a violation 
of the Constitution, but also a threat to the privacy inherent in marital relationships).  
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use contraception.
31
  Applying a strict-scrutiny test, the Court decided the 
regulation banning contraceptive use achieved its purpose by “means 
having a maximum destructive impact upon a marital relationship.”
32
  The 
regulation failed to be narrowly applied and was therefore an infringement 
on the right to privacy.
33
 
Following Griswold, women’s rights were expanded further by 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, which extended the right to contraception to single 
individuals.
34
  The Court found no rational basis to ban the distribution of 
contraceptives to unmarried persons but not married couples.
35
  The Court 
further expanded contraceptive rights in Carey v. Population Services 
International, holding that strict scrutiny must also be applied to state 
regulations that burden an individual’s right to contraception by 
substantially limiting an individual’s ability to actually exercise that right.
36
 
B. The Importance of Contraception Access 
Unplanned pregnancy remains one of the biggest public health problems 
in our country today.
37
  Approximately half of all pregnancies are 
unplanned or unwanted, with that number steadily increasing since 2006.
38
  
Unplanned pregnancies come with a multitude of issues that can have 
negative effects on the mother, the child, and society.
39
  Unplanned 
                                                          
 31.  See id.  
 32.  See id. at 485 (establishing that legislation regulating privacy interests, such as 
contraception, must pass a strict-scrutiny analysis, meaning the legislation must be 
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest by the least restrictive 
means). 
 33.  See id. (explaining regulations that are unnecessarily broad are an invasion of 
protected freedoms).  
 34.  See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446 (1972) (finding that no ground 
exists for according different treatment to married and unmarried persons regarding 
contraceptives).  
 35.  See id. at 448 (acknowledging the widespread availability of contraceptives to 
all persons, unmarried and married, and applying a rational basis test under the Equal 
Protection Clause, rather than a strict-scrutiny analysis under the Due Process Clause). 
 36.  See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977) (expanding 
upon the Griswold strict-scrutiny test). 
 37.  See Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t. of Health and Hum. Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 
261-62 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (concluding that the government sought to expand 
contraceptive access to assist in reducing unintended pregnancies); see also Unintended 
Pregnancy Prevention, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/unintendedpregnancy/ (last visited Aug. 21, 2016) 
[hereinafter CDC]. 
 38.  See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 261-62 (finding that the rate of unplanned 
pregnancies increased from forty-eight percent to fifty percent since 2006). 
6
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pregnancies can result in delayed prenatal care, premature birth, and 




The Center for Disease Control and Protection states that the main cause 
of unintended pregnancies is not using contraception, or using it 
inconsistently or incorrectly.
41
  Women who do not use contraception or 
use it inconsistently or incorrectly account for around ninety-six percent of 
unintended pregnancies.
42
  Conversely, those women who use 
contraceptives consistently and correctly account for less than five percent 
of unintended pregnancies.
43
  The most effective way to prevent unintended 




By preventing unintended pregnancies, contraception plays a major role 
in improving public health and wellbeing, reducing global maternal 
mortality, encouraging female engagement in the work force, and allowing 
women more economic independence.
45
  However, cost and access remain 
major barriers to contraception.
46
  The Institute of Medicine notes that even 
small increases in cost reduce the use of contraception and other 
preventative services.
47
  For instance, a national survey from 2004 of 
women ages eighteen to forty-four who were using reversible contraception 
found that “[w]omen citing cost concerns were twice as likely as other 
                                                          
 39.  See id. at 262 (including dangerous pregnancy complications, delayed prenatal 
care or premature birth, future infertility, and mental health issues once the child is 
born); see also Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage 
of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 8,725, 8,727 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). 
 40.  See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 262 (listing depression, anxiety, and domestic 
violence as consequences of unplanned pregnancies). 
 41.  See CDC, supra note 37; see also Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 262 (stating that 
couples using no method of contraception have an eight-five percent chance of an 
unintended pregnancy within twelve months). 
 42.  See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 262 (recognizing that stronger contraception 
access will decrease unwanted pregnancies). 
 43.  See id. at 261-62 (proving that contraception access plays a major role in 
preventing unintended pregnancies). 
 44.  See Access to Contraception, supra note 7 (stating that universal coverage of 
contraceptives is cost-effective and assists in reducing unintended pregnancy and 
abortion rates). 
 45.  See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 259-63. 
 46.  See id. at 260 (describing that people are hindered from preventative steps 
because costs and efforts are “immediate”); see also Access to Contraception, supra 
note 7. 
 47.  See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 261 (observing that high costs of contraception 
cause women to forego preventative care altogether). 
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women to rely on condoms or less effective methods like withdrawal or 
periodic abstinence.”
48
  In addition, a 2009 study found that economic 
hardships, such as the 2008 recession, significantly affect contraception use 
and family planning.
49
  The study of low- and middle-income sexually 
active women reported that in 2009, 34% said they had a harder time 
paying for birth control, 30% had put off a gynecological or birth control 
visit to save money, and 25% of pill users saved money through 
inconsistent use.
50
  Further, the methods that are most effective are often 
only available with a prescription or administered by a medical 
professional, which often come with higher costs.
51
  However, the no-cost 
coverage of contraceptive methods could greatly increase contraception use 
and decrease unintended pregnancies, therefore increasing public health.
52
 
C. The Affordable Care Act Contraception Mandate 
One of the more criticized legislation is the Affordable Care Act (ACA), 
also known as “Obamacare.”
53
  Formally known as The Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act, the “comprehensive” plan is known as President 
Obama’s crowning achievement, despite intense criticism from Republican 
leaders.
54
  Since the ACA was signed into law, over half of the states have 
filed lawsuits questioning its constitutionality.
55
  The Mandate is a 
provision of the ACA that has received continued disapproval.
56
  The 
Mandate requires health insurance companies to provide all women with 
access to contraceptives, sterilization, and preventative services.
57
 
                                                          
 48.  Testimony Submitted to Committee on Preventive Services for Women, 
Institute of Medicine 8 (Guttmacher Inst., Jan. 12, 2011), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/pubs/CPSW-testimony.pdf (finding 
that cost plays a key role in the use and method of contraceptives). 
 49.  Id.  
 50.  Id. 
 51.  See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 261 (finding that barriers such as needing a 
prescription from a medical professional deter women from obtaining contraception).  
 52.  See id.  
 53.  See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2016). 
 54.  See House v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 57 (2015) (consolidating challenges 
to the insurance subsidies under the ACA brought by thirty-eight Republican 
lawmakers). 
 55.  See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012) 
(discussing lawsuits filed by twenty-six states challenging the constitutionality of the 
ACA because of the barriers that impede the access to contraceptives).  
 56.  See § 300gg-13(a)(4); see also Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 
1114, 1143 (10th Cir. 2013) (challenging the Mandate’s constitutionality).  
 57.  See § 300gg-13(a)(4); see also Group Health Plans and Health Insurance 
Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and 
8
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1. Barriers to Contraception Access Under the Mandate 
Despite its early success, the Mandate has received criticism since its 
inception, most notably from religions organizations.
58
  The Obama 
Administration attempted to combat the religious opposition by making a 
minor concession in the form of a religious exemption, which did little to 
fix the resistance.
59
  The Mandate exempted religious employers, such as 
churches, houses of worship, and non-profit religious organizations from 
providing health care plans that cover contraception at no cost.
60
  The 
exemption allows certain religious employers to give notice of their beliefs 
to their insurance provider.
61
  Then the insurance company or the 
government, rather than the religious employer, is required to cover the 
costs of contraceptives.
62
  This accommodation allowed the government to 




The Mandate’s religious exemption was eventually expanded to exempt 
closely held for-profit entities with a religious objection to providing 
coverage.
64
  This exemption, combined with those employers that are 
exempt under grandfathered plans, places many women at a disadvantage 
                                                          
Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8,725, 8,726 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45 
C.F.R. pt. 147) (providing mammograms and prenatal care with no consumer cost 
sharing). 
 58.  See Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver, Colorado v. 
Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 1022, 1229 (2014) (challenging the Mandate’s religious 
exemption); Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1123; Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health 
and Hum. Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 245 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  
 59.  See generally Little Sisters of the Poor, 134 S. Ct. 1022 (demonstrating that 
organizations continue to file lawsuits against the Mandate and its religious exemption 
despite extension of the Mandate’s exemption to for-profit corporations). 
 60.  See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2016); see also Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 
1123 (describing the exemptions from the Mandate contraceptive-coverage 
requirement). 
 61.  See Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 
78 Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,874 (July 2, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147, 156) 
(providing religious employers with an accommodation to protect the employers from 
government infringement upon their religious beliefs). 
 62.  See id. (allowing women to still receive contraception free of cost, despite their 
employer’s exemption serves the government’s interests while protecting individuals’ 
and organizations’ religious beliefs). 
 63.  See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 263 (ruling that the accommodation for 
women meets both goals of protecting religious freedom while also ensuring women 
obtain contraceptives, resulting in an acceptable constitutional balance).  
 64.  See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014) 
(defining “closely-held” as corporations in which fewer than five people own more 
than half of company stock).  
9
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because they cannot receive the same contraception access as women 
whose employers are not exempt.
65
  This is an issue because, as Justice 
Sotomayor noted in a recent contraceptive mandate case, “[s]ome women 




In addition to those women who still face difficulties obtaining 
contraceptives due to employer exemption, there are millions of women 
who continue to face barriers to affordable and effective contraceptive care 
from their insurance companies.
67
  Many women are still victims of their 
insurance companies which often charge copayment for methods other than 
birth control pills, require prior approval from a doctor, or simply do not 
cover their preferred method of contraception.
68
 
D. Maryland’s Contraceptive Equity Act of 2016 
Maryland’s Contraceptive Equity Act (MCEA) was passed with 
overwhelming bi-partisan support and is one of the more comprehensive 
state contraception plans.
69
  The MCEA has several provisions aimed at 
providing greater access to contraceptives.
70
  It prohibits co-payment for 
most contraceptives with few exceptions.
71
  Additionally, the MCEA 
provides coverage for up to thirteen months of birth control and eliminates 
the need for a prescription in order to receive no-cost coverage of over-the-
counter birth control such as Plan B.
72
  Lastly, the MCEA covers the cost of 
                                                          
 65.  See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1124 (discussing the exemptions within the 
Mandate and their effects on contraception access). 
 66.  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Zubik v. Burwell, 2016 WL 1134578 
(No. 14-1418) (consolidating the religious objections of several groups of religious 
employers who lost in the lower court). 
 67.  See Access to Contraception, supra note 7 (explaining the barriers are 
attributable to a variety of factors including knowledge deficits, the restrictive legal and 
legislative climate, and cost and insurance coverage). 
 68.  See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a) (4) (2012); Priests for Life, 772 F.3d 
at 265 (revealing that one purpose of the Mandate was to end the harsh gender 
discrimination practices of private insurance companies). 
 69.  See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148 (West 2016); MD. CODE ANN., 
INS. § 15-826.1 (West 2016) (receiving 138 “yeas” out of 184 votes from the General 
Assembly). 
 70.  See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; see also MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 
15-826.1 (enabling more comprehensive coverage and easy access to multiple birth 
control methods and procedures to eliminate burdens left by the Mandate).  
 71.  See MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-826.1(e)(1)-(2).  
 72.  See id. § 15-826.1(e)(1)(i) (providing women with more freedom in their 
contraception choices).  
10
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male sterilization procedures, including vasectomies.
73
  These aspects of 
the plan make the MCEA the first contraceptive coverage plan to provide 
contraception access to both men and women.
74
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A. Burdens Created by the Mandate Are a Violation of the 
Constitutional Right of Privacy 
The Mandate’s over burdensome features are not narrowly applied to 
serve a compelling government interest.
75
  In order to protect the 
constitutional right to privacy, the Mandate must be amended to better 
serve the government’s interests in promoting public health and gender 
equality.
76
  In order to better serve the government’s interests, the Mandate 
should allow women to choose the method of contraception that works best 
for them, regardless of cost or the presence of a prescription.
77
 
The right to privacy has been deemed “the most comprehensive of 
rights” not only because of how much the right encompasses, but also 
because at its most rudimentary level, the right to privacy is essentially the 
right to choose whether or not to engage in certain acts or have certain 
experiences.
78
  The fundamental right to privacy has evolved over time to 
include an individual’s decision to procreate, which inherently includes a 
right to contraception.
79
  As a fundamental right, a woman’s right to 
                                                          
 73.  See id. § 15-826.2(a)(4). 
 74.  See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-
826.1.  
 75.  See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014) 
(stating that the contraceptive mandate serves a variety of important interests; however, 
many of the interests are phrased in very broad terms). 
 76.  See id. at 2770; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (providing the 
constitutional standard the Mandate is required to uphold).  
 77.  See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
835 (1992) (finding that a woman’s ability to control her reproductive health directly 
facilitates her ability to participate socially and economically); see also Priests for Life 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 265 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (noting 
that providing contraceptives without cost sharing or administrative burdens is 
necessary).  
 78.  See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (describing the right of privacy as protection against invasions into the 
“sanctities of a man’s home and the privacies of life”). 
 79.  See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972) (defining the right to privacy 
as, “the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision 
whether to bear or beget a child”). 
11
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contraception is protected by strict judicial scrutiny.
80
  Therefore, any 
government regulation controlling contraception access or use must be 
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.
81
 
The Court in Roe recognized that a government regulation denying 
women access to abortions would have detrimental results.
82
  Denying 
women access to abortions results in unwanted pregnancies, which can 
have damaging effects on the psychological health of both the mother and 
child.
83
  The Court concluded that an unplanned or unwanted pregnancy 
could leave the woman unprepared for motherhood and the accompanying 
stress, which could have negative impacts on the mental and physical 
health of all individuals involved.
84
  For these reasons, the Court concluded 
that the government must be limited when regulating a woman’s decision 
to have an abortion.
85
  Similarly, statutes denying women access to 
contraception will also lead to an increase in unwanted pregnancies.
86
  The 
unwanted pregnancies arising from contraception restrictions result in the 
same negative effects on mothers and children as the statutes denying 
abortions in Roe.
87
  In analyzing statutes and contraceptive coverage plans, 
                                                          
 80.  See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155-56, 163 (creating the strict scrutiny analysis for 
application in the right to privacy cases, including cases related to infringements upon 
the right to receive an abortion); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 479, 
485 (1965) (establishing the right to contraception as fundamental and subject to 
judicial scrutiny). 
 81.  See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.   
 82.  See id. (concluding that the state’s decision to deny a pregnant woman an 
abortion altogether is obviously detrimental). 
 83.  See id. (stating that unwanted pregnancies or offspring can result in a more 
stressful life for the woman in the future by causing depression and anxiety, among 
other mental health issues). 
 84.  See id.; see also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 853 (1992) (expressing that unwanted pregnancies can result in a 
mother’s inability to nurture and care for the infant, which causes distress to both the 
mother and offspring).  
 85.  See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (explaining that there would be a great detriment to 
women and society if the state was to impose such a burden of removing her choice 
altogether). 
 86.  See Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 
262 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (finding that couples without access to contraception were eighty-
five percent more likely to get pregnant than couples with access) (citing Clinical 




 87.  See id. at 261-62 (listing the negative effects of no contraception, including 
pregnancy risks); see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
12
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any regulation that is created must have a compelling state interest that is 
narrowly tailored and does not infringe on a woman’s right to privacy.
88
  
Therefore, the same limitations should apply to statutes that result in 
contraception restrictions that are detrimental to a woman’s right to choose 
and the right to privacy, including the Mandate.
89
 
The Court in Roe also recognized that the government possessed 
legitimate interests in regulating abortions.
90
  Consequently, the Court 
established a balancing test, intended to protect the right to privacy while 
considering the government’s interests.
91
  When the government’s interests 
become dominant, limitations on the right to privacy may be permitted to 
achieve and protect those compelling government interests.
92
  Likewise, 
similar compelling government interests have supported the Mandate, and 
these interests must be narrowly tailored and balanced against the burdens 
placed on women as a result of the Mandate’s restrictions.
93
  Although the 
Mandate must comport with the Roe balancing test, it fails to comport 
because it is not narrowly tailored nor does it appropriately balance the 
burdens to contraception access left on women.
94
 
During the Mandate’s inception, the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) partnered with the Institute of Medicine to 




                                                          
 88.  See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (applying a balancing 
test to determine if a regulation banning the sale of contraceptives was narrowly 
tailored to achieve a compelling government interest).  
 89.  See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155-56, 164-65 (providing the strict scrutiny analysis that 
should be applied to determine constitutionality of infringements upon the right to 
privacy). 
 90.  See id. at 154 (noting specific government interests for regulating abortions, 
such as safeguarding an individual’s health and protecting any potential life that might 
be harmed). 
 91.  See id. (explaining that there are constitutionally sound reasons for why and 
how a right to privacy in abortion might be limited and regulated). 
 92.  See id. at 163-64 (concluding that regulations that may impede on the right to 
privacy are constitutionally sound if protection of fetal life becomes necessary because 
of “logical and biological justifications”). 
 93.  See id. at 165; see also Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. 
Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 258-59 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (reporting the government’s interests in 
implementing the Mandate, including an interest in the physical health and safety of the 
public); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (applying a strict scrutiny 
analysis to a Massachusetts contraception regulation). 
 94.  See Access to Contraception, supra note 7, at 3 (describing the barriers to 
contraception access that exist despite the Mandate).  
 95.  See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 265 (describing the Mandate’s creation and 
implementation); see also Clinical Preventive Services for Women: Closing the Gaps, 
13
Nathan: Maryland's Bundle of Joy
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2017
  
224 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 25:2 
Throughout the Mandate’s creation, the HHS mentioned several 
government interests that the Mandate is intended to serve.
96
 Specifically, 
HHS mentioned the Mandate’s interest in protecting public health, safety, 
and morals, and ensuring that all women have access to all Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) approved contraceptives without cost sharing.
97
  
Throughout the Supreme Court’s history, it has considered all of these 
interests compelling enough to allow regulation and infringement upon the 
individual’s right to privacy, so long as they are applied narrowly.
98
 
The government’s central interest in creating and enforcing the Mandate 
was to increase the quality and access to preventative services, which was 
accepted as compelling by the Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby.
99
  HHS also 
maintains that the Mandate serves the government’s interest in promoting 
public health.
100
  The Supreme Court has continuously held in assessing the 
right to privacy that the government’s interest in safeguarding the public’s 
health should be considered a compelling one.
101
  Lastly, HHS sustains an 
interest in increasing gender equality, and the Supreme Court has 
considered this interest to be compelling because sex discrimination 
deprives women of their individual dignity and “denies society the benefits 
of wide participation in political, social and economic life.”
102
 
                                                          
INSTIT. OF MED. 1-2 (July 2011), 
http://www.nationalacademies.org/hmd/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2011/Clinical-
Preventive-Services-for-Women-Closing-the-
Gaps/preventiveservicesforwomenreportbrief_updated2.pdf [hereinafter Closing the 
Gaps]. 
 96.  See Closing the Gaps, supra note 95, at 4.  
 97.  See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014); see 
also Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 257 (concluding that the government asserted an 
interest in supporting more comprehensive, cost-free access to contraceptive services). 
 98.  See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 257-61 (explaining that there are 
circumstances, often pertaining to the health of the individual, in which a right to 
privacy can be limited and regulated for certain state interests).  
 99.  See Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2759 (holding “[u]nder RFRA, a Government action 
that imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise must serve a compelling 
government interest, and we assume that the HHS regulations satisfy this 
requirement.”). 
 100.  See id. at 2779 (asserting that any coverage of contraceptives adds to 
promoting public health). 
 101.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973); see also Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165-67 (1944) (upholding child labor laws because 
government interest in protecting the health and welfare of children was compelling). 
 102.  See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (recognizing a 
compelling interest in promoting women’s equal enjoyment of leadership skills); see 
also Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 263 (finding compelling the government’s interest as 
an effort to eradicate lingering effects of sex discrimination).  
14
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Although several compelling government interests support the Mandate, 
this does not automatically lead to the conclusion that the Mandate is 
constitutionally sound.
103
  A constitutional issue arises with the Mandate 
because of the government limitations that are consequently placed on a 
women’s right to privacy.
104
  Even though the regulations may further a 
compelling government interest, they are applied in an overly broad 
manner, placing substantial burdens on a woman’s control over her right to 
privacy.
105
  Specifically, the Mandate allows insurance companies to cover 
only one FDA-approved method under each category of contraceptives,
106
 a 
notion that is in conflict with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Planned 
Parenthood.
107
  Even though a statute may further a compelling 
government interest, if that statute has “the effect of placing a substantial 




The Supreme Court has continuously held that the government cannot 
freely further its interests at the expense of an individual’s right to privacy, 
and the same standard must apply to the Mandate.
109
  For example, the 
Supreme Court is currently in conflict with the Mandate’s regulations 
through its ruling in Carey.
110
  Specifically, the Court in Carey invalidated 
a similar statute that restricted access to contraception because several of 
the statute’s provisions placed significant burdens on individuals.
111
  In 
                                                          
 103.  See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
877 (1992); see also Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2780 (implying that free contraception was 
a compelling state interest); Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 259 (holding that the 
protection of the health and safety of the public supports the government’s interest in 
enforcing the Mandate’s contraceptive coverage requirement). 
 104.  See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977) (holding that 
even minor restrictions on access to contraceptives that work to significantly burden the 
right to decide to have a child must also pass constitutional scrutiny). 
 105.  See id. at 685-86; see also Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 877. 
 106.  See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012) (restricting coverage for women’s 
preventative care to services supported by the Health Resources and Services 
Administration). 
 107.  See Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 877 (ruling that any burdensome 
regulation is not a permissible means of serving even a legitimate end). 
 108.  See id. 
 109.  See id. at 851-52 (holding that the Constitution places limits on the 
government’s right to interfere with an individual’s decisions about his/her body and 
his/her future); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (establishing the strict 
scrutiny analysis to determine if a statute places significant burdens on individuals). 
 110.  See Carey, 431 U.S. at 685-86 (stating that the Constitution protects 
individuals to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into the decision 
whether to procreate). 
 111.  See id. at 696 (concluding that a regulation which prohibited the distribution of 
15
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Carey, the Court invalidated a provision that prohibited the distribution of 
nonmedical contraceptives to adults except through licensed pharmacists.
112
  
The Court found that the provision “clearly burden[ed]” and limited an 
individual’s decision to use contraception because not every individual 
would be able to easily access a licensed pharmacist.
113
  Furthermore, the 
Court disagreed that the provision could be justified by an interest in 
protecting health as it applied to nonhazardous contraceptives.
114
   
Similarly, the Mandate works to burden a woman’s decision to use 
contraception by limiting the contraceptive options available.
115
  Unlike 
other challenged contraception statutes, the Mandate appears to be 
narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest because it does not ban or 
restrict access to contraception.
116
  However, it is unconstitutional because, 
similar to the regulations in Carey, the Mandate restricts a woman’s right to 
privacy by limiting access to her preferred method of birth control.
117
  
Limiting a woman’s access to her preferred method of birth control is not 
narrowly tailored enough for it to be constitutional.
118
  Therefore, the 
Mandate should not be considered a permissible means to a legitimate end 
because the barriers placed on women are not sufficiently narrow to a 
legitimate end.
119
   
The Mandate places significant barriers on a woman’s ability to access 
                                                          
contraceptives to those younger than sixteen years of age placed unjustifiable burdens 
on young women attempting to gain access to contraception). 
 112.  See id. at 690-91.  
 113.  See id. at 689 (finding that restricting the distribution of contraception to 
licensed pharmacists “reduces the opportunity for privacy of selection and purchase, 
and lessens the possibility of price competition,” both of which place a burden on 
individuals seeking to purchase contraception). 
 114.  See id. at 690-91 (concluding that “preventing young people from selling 
contraceptives,” “facilitating enforcement of the other provisions of the statute,” and 
“preventing anyone from tampering with the contraceptives,” were not compelling state 
interests justifying infringement). 
 115.  See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012) (limiting a woman’s ability to choose 
her preferred method of contraceptives by limiting coverage to only methods supported 
by the Health Resources and Services Administration). 
 116.  See Carey, 431 U.S. at 685-86 (assessing the Mandate under strict scrutiny 
analysis); see also id. 
 117.  See Carey, 431 U.S. at 689-92 (concluding that limitations on the distribution 
of contraceptives burden the freedom to make such decisions and are therefore 
unconstitutional under a strict scrutiny analysis). 
 118.  See id. at 686 (stating that a regulation effecting the private decision of 
whether to have children requires compelling state interests that are narrowly drawn to 
express only those interests); see also § 300gg-13(a)(4) . 
 119.  See Carey, 431 U.S. at 687-88 (noting that restrictions on distribution of 
contraception may limit a woman’s ability to choose the method that she prefers).  
16
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and use contraception, and therefore her right to privacy, because insurance 
providers are allowed to cover only one form of each approved category of 
contraception.
120
  By restricting the contraception coverage to only one 
method in each of the twenty FDA-approved categories, the Mandate 
places significant barriers on a woman’s right to choose when and how to 
prevent or terminate a pregnancy.
121
  This can result in a woman’s inability 
to choose and receive the method that is going to be the best for her 
body.
122
  This also impedes the concept that patient choice and efficacy 




Contraceptive methods are not interchangeable, and a dramatic 
difference exists between methods depending on the product and the 
woman.
124
  Furthermore, women who are dissatisfied with their prescribed 
method are more likely to use the contraception incorrectly, inconsistently, 
or sporadically.
125
  To combat this misuse, women need access to not just 
any method of contraception, but to the “[o]ne most suitable for their 




An additional barrier to contraception access under the Mandate can be 
attributed to the fact that some insurance companies, clinics, and 
pharmacies require women to “fail” at using a less expensive method 
before they provide more expensive methods.
127
  This procedure runs 
                                                          
 120.  See id.; see also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (holding that regulations which place significant barriers to a 
woman’s access to reproductive services is a violation of the right to privacy); Priests 
for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 261 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(concluding that limited access to contraception can result in a woman being forced to 
choose a less effective method).  
 121.  See Access to Contraception, supra note 7, at 3. 
 122.  See id. at 2-3. 
 123.  See id. at 1-5 (noting that health care facilities and insurance providers should 
focus on patient care and choice to provide comprehensive contraception care). 
 124.  See Adam Sonfield, Rounding Out the Contraceptive Coverage Guarantee: 
Why ‘Male’ Contraceptive Methods Matter for Everyone, 18 GUTTMACHER POL. REV. 
34, 35 (2015), https://www.guttmacher.org/about/gpr/2015/06/rounding-out-
contraceptive-coverage-guarantee-why-male-contraceptive-methods [hereinafter 
Sonfield] (explaining why comprehensive contraception access is important to gender 
equality). 
 125.  See id. at 35; see also Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 265 (stating that women are 
unlikely to use contraception coverage when it is costly or complicated to obtain).  
 126.  See Sonfield, supra note 124, at 35.  
 127.  See Access to Contraception, supra note 7, at 3 (noting that many providers 
require an unsuccessful trial and error period before better and more expensive 
contraception may be provided). 
17
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counter to the government’s interest in promoting public health and 
expanding access to contraceptive methods.
128
  To serve the government’s 
interest in promoting public health, the Mandate must require coverage of 
all contraception methods from the beginning, not only after cheaper 
methods have proven ineffective.
129
 
In addition, HHS revealed that even modest or less expensive co-
payments deter some women from purchasing contraception.
130
  This 
causes some women who only have access to one method at no cost to 
decide not to purchase an alternative better method simply because it 
requires a co-payment.
131
  Accordingly, access to more than one method in 
each FDA approved category at no cost must be provided in order to 
lawfully serve the government’s interest in expanding the quality and 
access to preventive care.
132
 
Conclusively, by limiting no-cost coverage to only one method in each 
FDA approved category, the Mandate places significant barriers to a 
woman’s ability to control her reproductive life.
133
  This limitation works 
against the interests proposed by the government because the restriction not 
only limits women’s access to her preferred method of contraception, but 
also hurts public health and welfare.
134
  These aspects of the Mandate are 
not narrowly tailored enough even for government interests that may be 
compelling.
135
  Therefore, the Mandate fails the strict scrutiny analysis and 
                                                          
 128.  See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 260 (finding that even minor added steps 
dissuade women from obtaining contraceptives, and such obstacles fail to meet the 
government’s interest in enhancing access to contraception).  
 129.  See id. at 263 (stating that to serve the government’s interest in expanding 
contraception access, the contraception must be effective).  
 130.  See id. at 261 (resulting in women being deterred from using contraception 
because the cost is too high).  
 131.  See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2780 (2014) 
(demonstrating that even minor co-payments deter women from receiving 
contraception opposed to using the alternative and cheaper method). 
 132.  See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 260 (restating that even minor barriers, such as 
cost, deter women from receiving contraception, defeating the government’s interest in 
providing comprehensive contraception access). 
 133.  See Access to Contraception, supra note 7, at 2 (denying women the choice of 
contraceptive method results in her inability to exercise her right to reproductive health 
care); see also Sonfield, supra note 124, at 36 (noting that contraception allows people 
to plan if and when to reproduce). 
 134.  See Sonfield, supra note 124, at 36 (noting that reproductive planning enabled 
by contraception access helps prevent public health issues such as premature births and 
pregnancy complications).  
 135.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53, 155 (1973) (establishing the strict 
scrutiny standard that applies here). 
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should be invalidated as unconstitutional.
136
 
B. The Maryland Contraceptive Equity Act Eliminates Those Burdens, 
Becoming a More Constitutionally Sound Statute 
The MCEA’s broad coverage of contraceptive options firmly uphold a 
woman’s right to privacy by allowing the minimal amount of government 
intrusion, while placing little to no burden on the women’s ability to obtain 
the best contraceptives.
137
  The MCEA provides women with more options, 
while eliminating a variety of barriers to actual possession of contraception 
that currently exist under the Mandate.
138
 
Unlike the Mandate, the MCEA requires insurance companies to cover 
multiple contraceptive methods under each FDA-approved category at no-
cost.
139
  By requiring insurance companies to cover the costs of multiple 
contraception methods, the statute expands upon the Mandate, eliminating 
a huge barrier to contraception access.
140
  The MCEA stipulates that 
employers should provide coverage for methods of contraception that are 
not already covered.
141
  This assists women in acquiring an effective, 
uncovered contraception method if the covered method has been ineffective 
in treating the condition or if it has caused an adverse reaction to the 
woman.
142
  This allows women to receive the method that works best for 
them and it better serves the state’s compelling interest in safeguarding 
women’s health.
143
  This type of coverage helps to eliminate certain 
                                                          
 136.  See id. at 153 (holding that laws criminalizing abortion are not narrowly 
tailored to the government’s interest in women’s health and potential human life); see 
also 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012). 
 137.  See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148 (West 2016); MD. CODE ANN., 
INS. § 15-826.1 (West 2016) (providing more comprehensive contraception access 
reduces burdens on women in relation to preventative care).  
 138.  See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-826.1 
(providing women with more comprehensive contraception coverage through the 
elimination of almost all co-payments). 
 139.  Compare MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; and MD. CODE ANN., 
INS. § 15-826.1, with 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012) (comparing the MCEA, 
which covers multiple methods in each FDA approved category of contraception to the 
Mandate, which permits coverage of only one method from each category). 
 140.  See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-826.1 
(allowing women to choose which contraceptive measure is right for them, not just 
choosing the option that best fits with the contraceptive coverage plan). 
 141.  See MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-826.1 (expanding upon the Mandate’s coverage 
of contraceptive methods). 
 142.  See id. (expanding the access to contraceptives that are available to women 
under the contraceptive plan by providing coverage of more than one method). 
 143.  See Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 
259-60 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (applying the strict scrutiny test for a compelling government 
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contraception barriers left by the Mandate’s requirement that insurance 
companies only cover one method in each FDA-approved category.
144
 
The MCEA also allows women to obtain up to thirteen months of birth 
control at a time, which provides more security for women seeking to 
prevent pregnancy.
145
  According to the American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists, a major insurance barrier to contraception access 
includes “[l]imits on the number of contraceptive products dispensed.”
146
  
Insurance plan restrictions prevent seventy-three percent of women from 
receiving more than a single month’s supply of contraception at a time.
147
  
When combined with the fact that most women are unable to obtain 
contraceptive refills on a timely basis, these dispersal restrictions place 
major burdens on women who need to receive more than a one-month 
supply of contraception at a time.
148
  As opposed to the Mandate, which 
does not currently provide for long-term contraception access, the MCEA’s 




In addition, the MCEA also requires no-cost insurance coverage of over-
the-counter medications, including emergency contraceptives such as Plan 
B.
150
  This provision helps to expand contraception coverage under the 
Mandate, which currently provides no cost-coverage of strictly generic 
brands.
151
  Often times, women need immediate and effective care when 
making the decision to have a child.
152
  Emergency contraception allows 
                                                          
interest with a narrowly tailored regulation).  
 144.  See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-
826.1; § 300gg-13(a)(4). 
 145.  See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 261; see also Access to Contraception, supra 
note 7 (providing up to a year of contraception is cost effective and increases adherence 
and continuance rates). 
 146.  See Access to Contraception, supra note 7, at 3 (noting that the more barriers 
that are placed on contraceptives, the smaller the market place for contraceptives). 
 147.  See id. at 3 (deterring women from ordering their contraceptives because of the 
inconvenience of refilling the prescription every month, as opposed to receiving 
multiple months at a time). 
 148.  See id.  
 149.  See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-
826.1; § 300gg-13(a)(4). 
 150.  See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-
826.1; § 300gg-13(a)(4) (increasing access to over-the-counter medications, 
preventative, and emergency measures that are currently unavailable in the Mandate). 
 151.  See § 300gg-13(a)(4). 
 152.  See Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 
261 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (finding that enabling women to have more control over the time 
and space of their pregnancy improves health outcomes). 
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women an immediate solution when preventing unwanted or unplanned 
pregnancies by preventing pregnancy up to five days after sex.
153
  
However, these methods are often far more expensive than other methods, 
and cost is one of the biggest barriers to contraception access.
154
  For 
example, some emergency contraception methods can cost anywhere from 
$60 to $900 without insurance coverage.
155
  For some women, the high cost 
makes it virtually impossible to purchase emergency contraception and 
therefore, those women are denied control over their contraception access 
under the Mandate.
156
  This high cost unconstitutionally restricts 
contraception access because it impedes on a woman’s ability to exercise 
her right to privacy by limiting her ability to purchase the contraception 
method she so chooses.
157
 
Moreover, the MCEA requires insurance coverage for over-the-counter 
contraception, permitting women to purchase emergency contraception 
quickly and easily.
158
  This provision of MCEA helps to further the state’s 
compelling interest in promoting and protecting women’s health and 
welfare.
159
  By eliminating cost barriers to contraception access, the MCEA 
serves the government’s interests better than the Mandate.
160
  The MCEA 
does not place any cost burden on women who need to use an emergency 
                                                          
 153.  See Committee Opinion No. 544: Over-the-Counter Access to Oral 
Contraceptives, AM. COLL. OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS (Dec. 2012) 
https://www.acog.org/-/media/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Gynecologic-
Practice/co544.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20170315T2132390923 [hereinafter Over-the-Counter 
Access]; see also Morning-After Pill (Emergency Contraception), PLANNED 
PARENTHOOD, https://www.plannedparenthood.org/learn/morning-after-pill-
emergency-contraception (last visited Mar. 15, 2017). 
 154.  See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 261 (asserting that some prescription methods 
of contraception cost “nearly a month’s full-time pay for workers earning the minimum 
wage”). 
 155.  See Over-the-Counter Access, supra note 153; see also Morning-After Pill 
(Emergency Contraception), supra note 153. 
 156.  See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 260 (revealing that over fifty percent of 
women delay or avoid preventative care because of the high costs associated with 
contraception). 
 157.  See id. (explaining that people do not prioritize or plan for using preventative 
care when they are required to pay for it). 
 158.  See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148 (West 2016); MD. CODE ANN., 
INS. § 15-826.1 (West 2016) (providing no-cost coverage for Plan B and other 
contraception increases the likelihood that women will use contraception). 
   159.   See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 259 (concluding that a variety of adverse 
health conditions and costly care can be evaded with access to preventative services 
such as contraception). 
 160.  See id. at 260 (finding that the elimination of co-payments for contraception 
would result in an increase of its use). 
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contraceptive method, as opposed to the Mandate, which permits insurance 
companies and pharmacies to charge for name brands.
161
 
Lastly, the MCEA provides no-cost coverage for male sterilization, 
which further eases the burden on women.
162
  In contrast, the Mandate does 
not currently require no-cost coverage of male vasectomies and condoms, 
two preventative methods approved by the FDA.
163
  The absence of no-cost 
coverage of male contraception in the Mandate places women and couples 
at a disadvantage because the women are required to bear the burden of 
contraceptive coverage, which further limits their access to contraception 
by restricting their options.
164
  By expanding coverage to provide no-cost 
contraception to men, women are no longer the sole party with access to 
no-cost preventative services.
165
  This expansion furthers the government’s 
interest in promoting public health and gender equality.
166
  In addition, this 
provision helps to further the government’s interest in increasing social and 
economic welfare by decreasing unwanted pregnancies.
167
  Studies show 
that vasectomies are the second most effective contraceptive method, and 
are therefore more successful at preventing unplanned pregnancy.
168
  
Providing no-cost coverage of male contraception will further the 
government’s interest in promoting public health by providing couples with 
access to an even more effective method than those already covered by the 
Mandate.
169
  Furthermore, providing contraception methods to both sexes 
                                                          
 161.  See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-
826.1. 
 162.  See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-826.1 
(providing coverage for male sterilization provides women with a safer contraceptive 
alternative). 
 163.  See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012) (lacking no-cost coverage for male 
contraception). 
 164.  See id.; see also Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 263 (stating that in comparing 
men and women, women pay sixty-eight percent more in out-of-pocket health care 
costs than men, placing women at a significant economic and social disadvantage).  
 165.  See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 263 (stating that reproductive and preventative 
healthcare costs fail women disproportionally over men).  
 166.  See id.; see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 
(2014) (noting that an interest of the government is to promote and strengthen gender 
equality through the Mandate).  
 167.  See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 261 (explaining that expanding access to 
contraception allows women to forgo the physical burdens and risks of pregnancy 
unless they consciously make the choice to do so). 
 168.  See Sonfield, supra note 124, at 35. 
 169.  See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-
148 (West 2016); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-826.1 (West 2016); see also Priests for 
Life, 772 F.3d at 263. 
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allows the MCEA to uphold the right to marital privacy because it allows 
couples to choose which partner will engage in the preventing of 
pregnancy.
170
  Currently, approximately one-fourth of females rely on 
condoms and vasectomies as their main method of contraception.
171
  
Therefore the Mandate, unlike the MCEA, fails to provide effective no-cost 
coverage for women relying on male contraception.
172
  This supports the 
conclusion that the Mandate fails to serve the interest in providing 
comprehensive contraception coverage and promoting public health.
173
  In 
contrast, the MCEA’s coverage of vasectomies helps eliminate barriers left 
by the Mandate, better serving the government’s interests.
174
 
The MCEA provides more comprehensive coverage, passing strict 
judicial scrutiny to protect individuals’ fundamental right to privacy.
175
  
The MCEA helps to eliminate the burdens left by the Mandate by 
expanding upon the Mandate’s provisions to provide women with more 
contraception options at no cost.
176
  The inclusiveness of the MCEA better 
serves the state’s interest in safeguarding public health by providing 
coverage for a broader range of preventive services.
177
  By providing this 
broader coverage, both women and men have access to more contraceptive 
methods, resulting in stronger protections for public health.
178
  Not only is 
the MCEA more successful at promoting public welfare and increasing 
contraception access, but also more compatible with the Court’s ruling that 
infringements on the right to privacy must be narrowly tailored to serve 
                                                          
 170.  See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 263 (concluding that a preventative care 
package that fails to cover contraception would result in unequal access to the full 
range of health care services between the sexes). 
 171.  See Sonfield, supra note 124, at 36 (choosing options that include male 
participation). 
 172.  See id. (describing the statute’s failure to the quarter of women that rely on 
male coverage who are unprotected under the Mandate). 
 173.  See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 260 (failing the strict scrutiny analysis 
necessary for any infringement or regulation on the right to privacy).  
 174.  See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-
826.1. 
 175.  See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-
826.1; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 176.  See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-
826.1; 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012). 
 177.  See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 260 (providing coverage for emergency 
contraception, male sterilization, and other preventive methods that are not easily 
accessible through the Mandate’s provisions). 
 178.  See id. (promoting the government interest that protection of public welfare is 
compelling enough to support a statute regulating contraception access). 
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C. The Maryland Contraceptive Equity Act Will Survive Religious 
Objection and Strict Judicial Scrutiny 
State contraceptive equity laws can help to close the gaps left by the 
Mandate by providing even more comprehensive contraception 
coverage.
180
  However, many of these statutes contain religious exemptions 
similar to the exemptions provided for by the Mandate.
181
  Specifically, the 
MCEA contains a religious exemption that allows religious organizations 
to request exclusion from contraception coverage.
182
  The MCEA religious 
exemption stipulates that religious organizations may request exclusion if 
the required coverage conflicts with the religious organization’s “bona 
fide” religious beliefs and practices.
183
  The exemption also requires 
religious employers that obtain an exclusion to provide their employees 
with reasonable and timely notice of the exclusion.
184
  The religious 
exemption can reduce contraception access by restricting no-cost coverage 
to women who are employed by religious organizations but may not share 
the same religious objections.
185
 
State contraception laws often garner the same religious criticism 
received by the Mandate.
186
  For example, in 2004, several Catholic groups 
challenged the religious exemption contained in California’s Women’s 
                                                          
 179.  See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-
826.1; see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 (governing right to privacy infringements and the 
restrictions that may or may not be placed on the right to privacy). 
 180.  See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-
826.1 (providing an example of a comprehensive state contraception equity law).  
 181.  See § 300gg-13(a)(4). 
 182.  See MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-826(c) (allowing religious organizations that 
provide coverage to be exempt from providing their employees with contraceptive 
coverage in their plans).  
 183.  See id. (the statute’s broad language does not explicitly specify what qualifies 
as a “bona fide” religious belief). 
 184.  See id. (explaining the statute’s broad language does not explicitly specify 
what qualifies as “reasonable and timely notice”). 
 185.  See Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 
265 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (finding that there are millions of Americans that work for 
religious nonprofits but do not share the organization’s beliefs).  
 186.  See Catholic Charities of Sacramento v. Superior Court of Sacramento City, 10 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 283, 290 (2004) (challenging the constitutionality of California’s 
Women’s Contraception Equity Act); Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 
859 N.E.2d 459, 465 (N.Y. 2006) (challenging the constitutionality of New York 
Women’s Health and Wellness Act). 
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Contraception Equity Act (WCEA).
187
  These groups claimed that the 
statute forced the religious organizations to either refuse to provide health 
insurance coverage for its employees or facilitate the sin of contraception, 
both of which violated the organization’s religious beliefs.
188
  The 
California Supreme Court upheld the WCEA, applying a strict scrutiny 
analysis to conclude that the statute did not impermissibly impair the 
religious rights of Catholic Charities.
189
  Although a strict scrutiny analysis 
is not required for a state’s contraception equity statute to withstand a 
religious objection, several courts have applied this standard.
190
  Under this 
standard, a law cannot substantially burden a religious belief or practice 
unless it can be shown that the law used the least restrictive means to 
achieve a compelling interest.
191
 
As previously stated, the religious exemption contained in the Mandate 
has been challenged by multiple religious organizations, and in these cases, 
the Court has applied a strict scrutiny analysis under the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act.
192
  Specifically in Hobby Lobby, the Court concluded that 
the Mandate did not satisfy the strict scrutiny analysis because the Mandate 
substantially burdened the religious practice of for-profit corporations and 
did not satisfy the least-restrictive-means requirement.
193
  The Court 
concluded the government could achieve its goals through less restrictive 




                                                          
 187.  See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 290.   
 188.  See id. at 290-91 (arguing that notifying the government of their exemption 
facilitated the way contraceptives are provided). 
 189.  See id. at 315 (concluding that no less restrictive alternative exists because 
“any broader exemption increases the number of women affected by discrimination in 
the provision of health care benefits”). 
 190.  See id. (choosing to apply strict scrutiny analysis because no interpretation of 
the free exercise clause of California’s Constitution existed at the time). 
 191.  See id. (applying a strict scrutiny analysis similar to the judicial scrutiny 
applied to infringements upon fundamental rights). 
 192.  See Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, Denver, Colorado v. 
Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 1022, 1022 (2014); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 
1114, 1143 (10th Cir. 2013) (requiring “the government to demonstrate that mandating 
a plaintiff’s compliance with the objected-to requirement is the least restrictive means 
of advancing a compelling interest”). 
 193.  See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2767 (2014) 
(finding that the Mandate substantially burdened the exercise of religion when applied 
to for-profit, closely-held corporations). 
 194.  See id. at 2757-58 (concluding that a less restrictive method would require the 
“[g]overnment [to] assume the cost of providing the contraceptives at issue to any 
women who are unable to obtain them under their health-insurance policies due to their 
employers’ religious objections”). 
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Alternatively, applying a strict scrutiny analysis to the MCEA leads to 
the conclusion that the MCEA will withstand religious scrutiny if 
challenged.
195
  Unlike the Mandate, which explicitly did not provide an 
exemption to for-profit religious corporations, the MCEA provides the 
opportunity for an exemption to any religious organization.
196
  The MCEA 
contains a broader exemption, helping to eliminate the unconstitutional 
religious burdens created by the Mandate’s limited religious exemption.
197
 
Under the MCEA, no religious organization should be faced with a 
religious burden or ethical dilemma because the language provides an 
exemption for any organization with a genuine religious belief.
198
 
To defeat religious objection, the MCEA must be supported by 
compelling state interests.
199
  Several government interests, including 
increasing access to contraception and protecting public health and welfare, 
support the MCEA.
200
  Similarly, identical government interests support the 
Mandate, and the Court has concluded that these interests are compelling 
for the purposes of the government’s intrusion into religious practice.
201
  
Therefore, it is safe to assume the MCEA religious exemption will satisfy 
the compelling interest requirement of a strict scrutiny analysis because the 




For the MCEA’s religious exemption to withstand judicial scrutiny, the 
government must also show that the statute achieves its compelling 
interests through the least-restrictive means.
203
  The MCEA succeeds in 
                                                          
 195.  See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148 (West 2016); MD. CODE ANN., 
INS. § 15-826.1 (West 2016) (narrowly tailoring restrictions to the right to privacy to 
promote more access to contraceptives and public welfare). 
 196.  See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4)(2012); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-
148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-826(c).  
 197.  See § 300gg-13(a)(4); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148 (2016); MD. 
CODE ANN., INS. § 15-826.1. 
 198.  See § 300gg-13(a)(4); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148 (2016); MD. 
CODE ANN., INS. § 15-826.1. 
 199.  See Catholic Charities of Sacramento v. Superior Court of Sacramento City, 10 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 283, 315 (2004) (applying a strict scrutiny analysis to determine the 
validity of religious objections to state contraception statutes).  
 200.  See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-
826.1. 
 201.  See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014) 
(assuming the interest in guaranteeing no-cost access to contraceptive methods is 
compelling within the meaning of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).  
 202.  See id.; see also MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., 
INS. § 15-826.1. 
 203.  See Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2779 (detailing the requirements under strict 
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achieving the government’s interests through the least restrictive means 
because it provides an accommodation to all religious employers with 
“bona fide” religious beliefs.
204
  This accommodation is counter to the 
Mandate’s religious exemption, which fails to satisfy the least-restrictive 
means requirement because it grants religious accommodations to certain 
religious organizations but not others.
205
  Furthermore, the MCEA satisfies 
this requirement by providing contraception coverage in the least-
restrictive means possible, unlike the Mandate.
206
  When analyzing the 
Mandate’s religious exemption, the Court found that by restricting the 
religious exemption to only exemptions for non-profit religious 
organizations that the regulation resulted in a statute that was under-
inclusive.
207
  Because the Mandate does not provide an exemption to all 
religious organizations, the statute substantially burdens those 
organizations that are not religious non-profits.
208
  Therefore, the Court 
concluded that the Mandate’s religious exemption fails the least-restrictive 
means test.
209
  On the other hand, the MCEA allows for a broad exemption, 
which will satisfy the least-restrictive means test, because it provides an 
accommodation for all reasonable religious affiliations.
210
 
To accommodate religious beliefs while furthering the state’s interest in 
protecting and promoting women’s health, the MCEA religious exemption 
applies to all religious organizations with a legitimate belief.
211
  This helps 
                                                          
scrutiny analysis of religious exemptions). 
 204.  See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-
826(c). 
 205.  See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-
826(c) (finding that the Mandate, as applied to for-profit, closely-held corporations, 
failed to satisfy the least restrictive means requirement). 
 206.  See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-
826(c) (providing an accommodation to religious organizations regardless of whether 
they are a for- or non-profit organization); see also Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2779 (holding 
that the government had other means of achieving its goal without imposing a 
substantial burden on the exercise of religion by the objecting parties in these cases). 
 207.  See generally Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (finding that the Mandate provided an 
accommodation to some religious organizations but not others.) 
 208.  See id. at 2785 (pointing out that the government has previously demonstrated 
that it has an approach that is less restrictive than requiring employers to fund 
contraceptive methods that impinge upon their religious beliefs). 
 209.  See id. (finding that the government has the ability to achieve its interests 
through less restrictive means and therefore, the more restrictive method is 
constitutional). 
 210.  See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-
826(c). 
 211.  See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-
826(c) (providing broad language that does not include a definition for “bona fide” 
27
Nathan: Maryland's Bundle of Joy
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2017
  
238 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 25:2 
satisfy the least-restrictive means test required by the statute because it 
appears the government lacks other means to achieve both of these goals.
212
 
The MCEA’s constitutionally sound religious exemption further helps to 
fill the gaps left by the Mandate.
213
  The MCEA better serves the 
government’s interest in ensuring comprehensive contraception coverage 
while providing legitimate religious organizations with an accommodation 
that does not infringe upon the organization’s free practice of religion.
214
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Despite the fact that the Mandate has increased contraception access in 
the United States, it has been unsuccessful in eliminating all of the barriers 
to contraception.  In contrast, many states have begun enacting 
comprehensive contraception laws that help remove unconstitutional 
barriers left by the Mandate.  The MCEA is the strongest of these state 
statutes, providing more constitutionally comprehensive coverage than the 
Mandate. The MCEA fulfills the compelling governmental interest 
requirement necessary for the Supreme Court’s strict scrutiny test by 
helping protect public health and welfare, eliminating gender 
discrimination, and providing preventative services at no cost to women.  
By providing no-cost coverage for almost all contraception methods, as 
well as male sterilization, the MCEA fills the gaps left by the Mandate 
while providing a strong guideline for other states’ contraception equity 
acts to follow.  By eliminating the burdens left by the Mandate, the MCEA 
serves as the most effective statute in upholding the constitutional right to 
privacy through narrowly tailored means. 
 
                                                          
beliefs).  
 212.  See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-
826(c). 
 213.  See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-
148; MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-826(c) (providing a broad exemption helps to 
accommodate religious beliefs in the least restrictive means, eliminating the Mandate’s 
infringements upon certain religious organization’s beliefs). 
 214.  See § 300gg-13(a)(4); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-148; MD. CODE 
ANN., INS. § 15-826(c). 
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